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This article distinguishes three discourses of reflexivity in relation to 
human inquiry. One of these arises from a post-modern, relational 
constructionist perspective which radically re-conceptualizes 
reflexivity: (a) as a local and co-constructed process oriented towards 
the question (b) how are we ‘going on’ together, and therefore paying 
attention to (c) the realities and relations we are co-creating during 
the research process and so (d) is concerned with local pragmatic and 
ethical issues (Gergen & Hosking, 2006; McNamee, 1994) rather than 
with the quality of truth claims. Regular reflexive dialogues as part of, 
and directed at, the research process can heighten the local use value 
of research for all participants and can facilitate new possible realities 
and relations. Key Words:  Reflexivity, Relational Responsibility, 
Responsive Inquiry, Relational Constructionism, Postmodernism, and 
Ethics 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last twenty-five years or so, publications in the general area of human 
inquiry have embraced a wider range of social science perspectives and methods.  
Discussions have explored the relative merits of "modernism" and "post-modernism," 
and meta-theories such as critical theory and social constructionism have been further 
articulated and critiqued. In addition, the use of qualitative methods has increased and 
their merits, relative to quantitative, much discussed. Gradually, an increasingly 
contextualised and nuanced approach has emerged that assumes discussions of inquiry 
necessarily “put to work” particular meta-theoretical assumptions and interests that 
could be otherwise.  
Of particular relevance to our interests in this present article are discussions of 
post-modern, meta-theoretical assumptions together with their implications for 
research interests and practices. Important issues include the stance and role of the 
researcher relative to other research participants, possible forms and styles of 
reporting, possible quality standards, and reflexivity. It is the last of these issues that 
provides our framing and focus in this article in that a "post-modern" position 
involves a very particular construction of reflexivity, that is one that reflects a critical 
stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge (e.g., Chia, 1996; Gergen, 1999; Steier, 
1991).  
Our interest is in relational constructionism and its potential implications for 
reflexive practices in human research. We begin by outlining our post-modern, 
relational constructionist premises and say something more about our particular 
interest in reflexivity. We then put our premises to work to distinguish and discuss 
three different constructions of reflexivity. The first two, “removing bias” and 
“making bias visible,” are well known; they are outlined and commented on from a 
relational constructionist standpoint. The third, “ongoing dialoguing,” is less well 
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articulated and less commonly practiced. It follows directly from relational-
constructionist meta-theoretical premises and can contribute to a further expansion of 
possible purposes and practices in human inquiry (see e.g., Gergen & Thatchenkery, 
1996).  
 
A Relational Constructionist Meta-Theory 
 
When speaking of different meta-theoretical positions writers used terms such 
as “paradigm” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Kuhn, 1970), “research orientation” (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2000), “intelligibility nucleus” (Gergen, 1994), “thought style” (Chia, 
1995; Fleck, 1979) and “perspective” (Cox & Hassard, 2005). Meta-theoretical 
positions are defined by their differing assumptions concerning ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. In this section we draw upon an extremely wide 
range of literatures with equally wide-ranging interests to summarise “relational 
constructionist” premises; more detailed elaborations can be found elsewhere 
(Hosking, 2006a).   
 
Ontology is given to relational processes 
 
 It is very common, both in everyday life and in the literatures on human 
inquiry, to assume that persons have an interior world (of thoughts and feelings and so 
on) and inhabit an exterior world consisting of sentient and non-sentient objects, and 
events. As a consequence, research is directed towards producing knowledge about 
interior and/or exterior worlds (Deetz, 1996). In contrast, our meta-theoretical 
assumptions do not centre stable, bounded, and independently existing people and 
things as ‘real’ and knowable realities. Nor, unlike some versions of social 
constructivism and social constructionism, do we centre knowledge about these 
realities as more or less objective or more or less subjective. Rather, we give ontology 
to relational processes and the local realities they make, break and re-construct. 
Borrowing Chia's felicitous phrasing, we assume an “ontology of becoming” rather 
than the more usual “ontology of being” (Chia, 1995, 1996).   
Given our centring of processes, self-other and relations are viewed as 
ongoing relational constructions; constructions of identities and relationships become 
the centre of interest in human inquiry (Hosking, 2006b). Among other things, this 
implies that we do not start with the traditional identity construction of The 
Researcher in place and we do not go on, so to speak, by taking it for granted, e.g., 
through seeing The Researcher as the (one and only) expert knower and seeker-after-
truth (see e.g., Gergen & Hosking, 2006). Rather we assume that, for example in 
organising processes, identities and relations are always ongoing relational realities 
rather than inputs and/or outcomes of mediating processes (Pearce, 1992).   
But how may relational processes be further theorised? We can begin to 
answer this by turning our attention to language.  
 
Multiple relational realities are co-constructed in language-based relational 
processes 
 
Theorists who centre separate and bounded individuals (an ontology of being) 
and their subjective and objective knowledge also centre conceptual language as the 
means by which individuals represent the reality of internal and external worlds 
(Gergen & Thatchenkery, 1996). In contrast, we discourse language as relating and 
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so constructing relational realities. This gives emphasis to language as action and 
invites a wider inclusion of the many ways in which relating ‘goes on’ such as e.g., 
non-verbal gestures, posture, movement and voice tone, and involving what some 
might call natural objects together with artefacts of human activity. Our interest is in 
relating – in “any act or artefact that might be coordinated with in some way, so 
constructing a communication” (Hosking, 1999, p. 120).  
Our focus on relating and emergent identities requires a way of theorizing 
what is related with what. So, for example, we might speak of acts supplementing 
other acts i.e., inter-acts, or we might speak of relating texts in multiple text-con-text 
relations or inter-textuality (Dachler & Hosking, 1995; Gergen, 1995). Returning to 
the context of inquiry and the construction of identities, we can reflect on how an act 
such as handing over a questionnaire might be supplemented by, for example, 
someone taking the questionnaire, sitting down and filling it in. Of course other 
supplements are also possible such as tearing it up, making a paper plane or making 
the “reverse suggestion”- “why not fill it in yourself”? By this we see that some act-
supplement relations or inter-textualities may emerge and be regularly re-constructed 
as conventional. At the same time, other supplements or con-texts are rendered un-
conventional, inappropriate, foolish or just plain wrong.  
 
Constructions are local-cultural and local-historical 
 
 Following from the above, it is clear that relational processes construct and 
re-construct what can and cannot go as far as local relational realities are concerned; 
so we are not saying that “anything goes.” Our premises direct attention, both to the 
varying possibilities of particular texts or acts being performed, and to the possibility 
that they will be supplemented, and if so – with what effect – such that they are 
"socially certified," "credited," or "dis-credited" as relevant or irrelevant, good or bad 
(Gergen, 1995; Hosking & Morley, 1991). This means that relational realities are 
assumed to be local to the (organising) processes in which they are made and re-made 
– local-cultural and (simultaneously) local-historical; we shall say more. 
First, "local" has meaning in contrasting relation to the assumption of a 
universal, stable reality and transcendental knowledge of its characteristics. The 
relational realities of which we speak are presumed to be local to the processes in 
which they are made and re-made. We are taking a view somewhat similar to 
Wittgenstein’s talk of “language games” and the “forms of life” of which they are a 
part (Wittgenstein, 1953). Returning to the construction of research, we may think of 
our earlier mentioned questionnaire study as part of a research programme conducted 
by researchers committed to the same view of science and therefore to the same 
methodological standards and quality criteria. The inquiry process will carry “traces” 
of these relations (Gergen, 1999), that is, of the researchers’ particular scientific 
community or “form of life.” The inquiry process will also reflect “traces” of the 
research object’s “form(s) of life.” The researcher’s form of life may dominate e.g., as 
in controlled experiments, or the inquiry process may be more open and pluri-vocal 
e.g., as in participative action research (Allard-Poesi, 2005) or Appreciative Inquiry 
(Allard-Poesi; Van der Haar & Hosking, 2004).  
Second, our reference to local includes a historical aspect in the sense that 
relational processes and realities have an “always already” and ongoing quality. To 
continue our example, it is because researchers act in relation to a very particular 
“form of life” – such as their local science culture – that they evaluate the quality of 
their research in terms of already conventional (scientific) definitions of reliability 
  62                                                                        The Qualitative Report January 2010 
and validity. So their claims will be warranted as (not) “scientific” in relation, for 
example, to the grand narrative of progressive science (Alvesson, 2002).  It is in such 
moving constructions that history is made and re-made by re-creating stabilities, by 
changing (previously stable) relational realities, and by constantly offering 
possibilities for transforming identities and relations (Hosking, 2004).   
 
Reflexivity as local construction 
 
Our relational constructionist premises invite a view of research processes as 
ongoing processes of (re)constructing self (perhaps as a researcher), other (perhaps as 
the researched) and relationships (McNamee, 1994; Rhodes & Brown, 2005). We can 
now shift from the positive science interest (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) in finding out 
about how things really or probably are to reflecting on the kinds of people and 
worlds that are under construction or “becoming.” This shift makes space for quality 
criteria that positive science positions as outside its scope including, for example, 
ethical and aesthetic considerations and local (perhaps multiple and differing) criteria 
of local usefulness (perhaps for all participants; McNamee, 1994; Rhodes & Brown, 
2005).  Further, given the always ongoing quality of processes, these considerations 
apply to all aspects of the research process including what positive science would call 
“design and planning,” research procedures, report writing and presentation. 
The above considerations all open up a very different “possibility space” for 
reflexivity. The latter: is no longer a matter for the community of science alone; is no 
longer restricted to evaluating the quality of research methodology, methods and 
knowledge claims in relation to what is (probably) true, and; is no longer theorised as 
individual activity. Reflexivity now can be discoursed in relation to the multiple local 
conventions, norms and interests of the various participating “forms of life.” This 
introduces an ethical aspect concerning relations between these “forms”: whilst equal 
co-construction is assumed in principle, in practice one form might dominate others. 
So, for example, the scientific “form of life” often achieves power over other local 
community-based rationalities. Continuing this theme, the possibility of different but 
equal relations introduces a possible reconstruction in which reflexivity becomes a 
matter of ongoing dialogues throughout the research process. In this view, reflexivity 
becomes a relational process in which ethics and relevance are variously constructed 
in relation to the (differing) particularities of the communities whose “traces” are 
implicated (McNamee, 1994). Reflecting ‘from within’ some ongoing research 
process opens-up the space for multiple local constructions, for dialogue and 
transformation.  
 
With each reflexive reprise, one moves into an alternative discursive 
space, which is to say, into yet another domain of relatedness. 
Reflexive doubt is not then a slide into infinite regress but a means of 
recognizing alterior realities and thus giving voice to still further 
relationships. (Gergen, 1994, p. 48) 
 
Summarizing words 
 
 Our relational constructionist premises say nothing about “real” reality or 
knowledge of the same. Indeed, our premises position familiar dualisms such as 
reality and knowledge, individual-social, self and other, language and action, 
subjective-objective, and process-outcome – as possible constructions that can be 
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otherwise. We have collapsed the traditional analytical philosophy demarcation 
between the context of discovery - the context of science, of empirical work - and the 
context of justification - the context of philosophy, of reason or rational work 
(Harding, 1986; Hosking, 2008). Our different starting point has been to centre an 
ontology of becoming in which the relational realities of self-other and relations 
(persons and worlds) are in ongoing construction in local-cultural, local-historical, 
language-based processes of inter-action. Our relational-constructionist premises give 
us a position from which to view existing constructions of reflexivity and open-up a 
"possibility space" (Harding, 1998) for newly relevant practices of human inquiry. 
  
Three Discourses of Reflexivity 
 
We can now put our meta-theoretical assumptions to work, so to speak, to re-
view existing constructions of reflexivity in research. First we outline the perhaps 
best-known practices - oriented towards producing valid and reliable knowledge about 
some pattern of relations between real world objects. Because it is perhaps the best-
known discourse we feel we need only briefly to summarize its main characteristics. 
The second discourse, when viewed with “a relational constructionist eye,” appears to 
be a not very radical revision of the first. However, because the differences between 
this and the third discourse are often overlooked we engage in a more extended 
discussion. Third, we return to our earlier sketch of the new possibilities enabled by 
relational constructionist premises and discuss reflexivity as ongoing dialoguing. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the three discourses. 
 
Table 1 
 
Overview of reflexivity discourses 
 
 
 
Discourse 1. Minimizing bias 2. Making bias visible 3. Ongoing dialoguing 
Meta-theory Positive science 
 
Positive science 
 
Relational constructionism
Main 
concern 
Checking the soundness of 
knowledge claims 
Checking the soundness of 
knowledge claims and/or 
use-value for ‘locals’ 
Quality of ongoing 
processes 
 
Agency 
 
Individual act of researcher Individual act of researcher Relational process  
When Beginning and end In multiple phases and emphasizing end report Continuous 
Approach to 
ethics 
 
Quality concern peripheral 
to scientific interest in 
generalizable knowledge 
 
Quality concern peripheral 
to scientific interest in 
generalizable knowledge 
A central quality concern, 
interwoven with use-value 
View of 
intervention Separable from inquiry Separable from inquiry 
Inquiry is intervention, 
Intervention is 
transformation 
 
  
 
  64                                                                        The Qualitative Report January 2010 
Discourse 1: Minimizing Bias 
 
(Post)positivist (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) or “positive” science constructs 
research - and therefore reflexivity - as an individual act oriented towards evaluating 
the scientific quality of knowledge claims. Assumptions about epistemology centre 
knowledge of “real world” objects and distinguish between subjective and objective 
knowledge “about the world in its so being.” The job of empirical research is to 
produce objective knowledge (in so far as that is possible) that can provide firm 
foundations for generalizations and predictions about possible relations (particularly 
causal). Given these themes, scientists discourse reflexivity as one of the special and 
defining characteristics of science - as something that science does to check the 
reliability and validity of its knowledge claims (Gergen, 1994; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; 
Hosking, 1999; Kerlinger, 1964).   
For the empiricist researcher, the hypo-thetico-deductive method is the method 
of choice (Gergen, 1994; Kerlinger, 1964). The meta-theoretical assumptions centre 
an individual researcher with a knowing mind who knows of the possibility of error 
and distortion as it might affect the quality of his observations and knowledge claims. 
The potentially rational researcher attempts to produce knowledge that approximates 
the true state of things by systematically designing and attempting to standardize and 
control his methods and procedures for data collection. His design and procedures are 
intended to provide data that can verify or falsify the null hypothesis. To act as a 
member of some (post)positivist research community, the researcher must reflexively 
examine his theory, methods and procedures to estimate how they contributed to his 
research findings. In this construction, reflexivity is largely a retrospective act that 
evaluates inputs (such as measures) and processes to determine the quality of the 
research outcomes - the ”findings” - of what is regarded as a now finished research 
process.  
Reflexive practices apply (often statistical) techniques for evaluating the data. 
Questions of reliability and validity are centred: how reliable are my measures and 
findings and do they measure what I say they measure? These practical applications 
or checks are limited to the “context of discovery” (i.e., to the empirical domain). This 
means that reflexive practices rarely include examination of the meta-theoretical 
assumptions defining the “context of justification” and so, ignore major contributing 
con-texts that contribute to shaping the research. It is true that some such as Frederick 
Kerlinger theorise “construct validity” (one aspect of reflexivity) as “much more than 
technique.” Indeed, Kerlinger suggests construct validity is “heavily philosophical” in 
the sense of having a wider concern for the theoretical and meta-theoretical context in 
relation to which methodology is designed and data collected (Kerlinger, 1964). But 
practical application of this view is exceedingly rare.  
  
Discourse 2: Making Bias Visible 
 
The positive science construction of reflexivity is oriented around minimising 
“error” – understood as unexplained variance. This is somewhat revised in our second 
discourse which stresses that certain sources of error cannot be eliminated and should 
therefore be made visible insofar as this is possible (see also Hardy, Philips, & Clegg, 
2001; Linstead, 1994). Reflexive researchers now must attempt to make visible what 
positive science constructs as their sources of subjectivity such as their ethnic and 
gender biases, reasoning and paradigm. In addition, so the argument goes, they must 
do so in order that readers can make their own judgements about the quality, accuracy 
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and usefulness of the research outcomes. Last, we should say that this construction of 
reflexivity also continues to embrace positive science assumptions of bounded 
individuals with minds who construct individual knowledge that may be more or less 
objective. Research practices continue to centre The Researcher and the researcher’s 
“form of life” by striving for objectivity. In this way, research can be claimed as 
useful for producing data that can serve as the basis for subsequent interventions. 
Examples of writings that construct reflexivity as individual activity of this 
sort include: Abma (1996), Alveson and Sköldberg (2000), Lewis and Kelemen 
(2002), Gouldner (1970) and Stake (1975, 1995). We will discuss two examples: 
Stake’s work on “responsive inquiry” and Alvesson and Sköldberg’s “reflexive 
methodology.” We do so for three reasons: to justify our positioning of this discourse 
as a “not very radical” variant of Discourse 1; to reflect on meta-theoretical 
differences from our own view (Discourse 3), and; to clarify those aspects that could 
be seen as similar to our discourse of reflexivity. In each case, we will briefly 
summarize their work, their meta-theoretical assumptions and the ways these are 
reflected in their constructions of reflexivity. 
  
Example 1: Robert Stake’s responsive inquiry  
 
Central to Stake’s responsive approach is his aim to increase the usefulness of 
research for the people involved in inquiry and not just the researcher (Stake, 1975). 
He assumes value pluralism and therefore considers it essential to give voice to the 
differing perspectives of those involved. This implies that Stake prefers a research 
design that is, in some degree emergent. According to Stake, the primary focus of an 
inquiry must not be on a method and design predetermined by the researcher because 
this would imply that s/he could know in advance what will be important, which 
variables will need to be studied and which criteria will need to be employed.  So: as 
the program moves in unique and unexpected ways, the evaluation efforts should be 
adapted to them. (Stake, 1975, p. 29)  
Following data collection and analysis, Stake prefers to communicate the 
results in the form of thick (as opposed to thin) descriptions so that the diversity in 
values and in perspectives is shown in the report.  It should be stressed that, although 
Stake values the voices of those involved in an inquiry, The Researcher-evaluator 
continues to be centred and is expected to remain in control of all aspects of the study 
(Abma & Stake, 2001; House, 2001). Stake is firmly opposed to stakeholder 
participation in scientific decisions because, in his view the researcher has, “the 
professional talent and discipline to carry out an inquiry” (Abma & Stake, p. 9). 
What Stake calls “responsive” inquiry is aimed at making research useful for 
the participants involved. For this reason, Stake introduced two concepts that are 
central to his approach and that suggest the key to his construction of reflexivity. The 
first he called “vicarious experience” - defined as “drawing experiential 
understandings from the narratives of others” (Stake, 1995, p.173). Researchers have 
the important task of writing research reports using thick descriptions so that readers 
can judge the quality and usefulness of different values andjudgements and the 
research results. In other words - and here the second concept comes in - the vicarious 
experience makes it possible for readers to make “naturalistic generalizations.” By 
this Stake means that readers may judge for themselves the possible utility of these 
particular research findings in other contexts.   
We need to turn to Stake’s meta-theoretical assumptions in order better to 
understand his construction of reflexivity (see e.g., Stake, 1975, 1995). First, he seems 
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to make a sharp distinction between objective and subjective knowledge. Together 
with other post-positivist researchers, he believes that objectivity is unattainable 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Nevertheless, he believes that researchers should strive for 
what he called ”sophisticated constructions” and ”accurate descriptions” of reality. 
Vicarious experience and naturalistic generalizations are Stake’s preferred solution to 
the problems that follow from the (generally accepted to be) blurred distinction 
between subject and object. In his view “research is not helped by making it appear 
value-free. It is better to give the reader a good look at the researcher” (Stake, 1995, p. 
95).  
Second, as we have seen, Stake (1995) sees The Researcher as the one who 
should be in control of the inquiry. For Stake, it is the individual researcher who is 
responsible for the research, for reflexivity, and for making their descriptions as 
accurate as possible. In other words, Stake constructs the researcher identity as the 
knowing subject – who acts towards other as a knowable and formable object 
(Dachler & Hosking, 1995; Hosking & McNamee, 2006). Research and reflexivity are 
limited by the scientific community's community-based normative standard whereby 
The Researcher must strive for (though necessarily fail fully to achieve) subject-
object relations (Gergen, 1994). 
Third, for Stake (1995), reflexivity has the function of heightening the quality 
of an inquiry in the dual sense of enhancing the accuracy of representations and the 
visibility of bias. An important assumption centred in Stake’s approach is the 
existence of a world “out there.” The epistemological priority in his work lies in 
representing this reality as accurately as possible. Making bias visible must contribute 
to the realization of this objective.  
Fourth, the concept of vicarious experience suggests that Stake (1995) makes a 
sharp distinction between process and outcomes. Fifth, for Stake reflexivity is 
something that is most relevant at the end of an inquiry in that it is mainly concerned 
with reporting strategies.  
 
Example 2: Alvesson and Sköldberg’s reflexive methodology 
 
These authors criticize empirical work that focuses on techniques and 
procedures to the neglect of meta-theoretical issues. At the same time they emphasize 
the subjectivity of every research enterprise (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). They also 
believe that meta-theoretical debates in organisation studies have not proven to be 
very useful for doing research. Therefore they characterize their “project” as “an 
intellectualization of qualitative method” and a “pragmatization of the philosophy of 
science” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, p. vii).  
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) discuss and reflect upon empirical approaches 
together with hermeneutics, critical theory and postmodernism. Whilst others view 
these as “incommensurable” (see e.g., Thompson & McHugh, 1995) Alvesson and 
Sköldberg take the view that each has an important contribution to make to the 
construction of a “reflexive methodology.” They argue that a) empirically oriented 
methods teach us to make contact with empirical material, b) hermeneutics raises the 
awareness of the interpretive act c) critical theory shows the importance and influence 
of political-ideological contexts and last, d) postmodernism helps the reflexive 
researcher in handling the question of representation and authority. Thus, for 
Alvesson and Sköldberg reflection means: “interpreting one’s own interpretations, 
looking at one’s own perspectives from other perspectives, and turning a self-critical 
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eye onto one’s own authority as interpreter and author” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, p. 
vii).  
Whilst Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) believe in the value of combining 
different meta-theoretical positions they do not explicitly set out the meta-theoretical 
assumptions that underpin their view. Let us try to see what they might be, starting 
with their focus on interpretations. First, on epistemology, although they criticize 
those who believe in the possibility of objective knowledge they leave intact and 
continue to centre the objective-subjective binary. Thus, like Stake (1995) they 
address some of the problems associated with the positivist construction of objective 
knowledge and look for solutions by reflecting upon subjectivities 
Second, on ontology, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) state that they find it: 
“pragmatically fruitful to assume the existence of a reality beyond the researcher’s 
ethnocentricity and the ethnocentricity of the research community” (p. 3). 
In their view, reflexivity is important because it helps the researcher to come 
closer to an accurate description of this assumed reality. This shows how in this 
second discourse reflexivity is an epistemological priority. This is not our view. Last, 
and consistent with these assumptions, it seems that Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) 
view reflexivity as an individual act and an individual responsibility – and it is The 
Researcher's responsibility to be reflexive in order to do ”good research.” Again as we 
shall show we take a different view.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 This second discourse of reflexivity continues to assume relatively stable and 
bounded individuals, with knowing minds, acting in relation to other individuals and 
relatively stable structures that constrain and support individual action. Reflexivity 
continues to be oriented around an epistemological interest, although findings are 
recognised as value-mediated. “Good research” continues to be defined in relation to 
the norms and interests of identifiable scientific communities where varying emphasis 
is given to (the now blurred distinction between) facts and values. What we find 
attractive and resonates with our own position is Stake’s emphasis on use-value to 
”the locals” and Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2000) view of reflexivity as intrinsic to 
the entire research process. This said, following our different meta-theoretical position 
we will show that our view of reflexivity constitutes a radical departure from the first 
two discourses.  
 
Discourse 3: Ongoing Dialoguing 
 
Our relational constructionist meta-theory implies that the processes that some 
call “research” are processes in which the identities of researcher, research object and 
related realities are in ongoing re-construction. Part of what this means is that subject-
object relations or indeed some alternative, perhaps “softer” self-other differentiation, 
are viewed as constructions implicating perhaps multiple "forms of life". The centring 
of construction invites a view of research as intervention, the centring of relating 
implies that ethics and responsibility be re-constructed and centred e.g., through 
reflexive dialogues, and talk of multiple forms of life invites attention to multiple 
local ways of knowing and “power to.” We shall finish with a brief discussion of each 
of these themes. 
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Research as Intervention 
 
Some argue that the current status of the sciences is at the margins of cultural 
life (Gergen, 1994). John Shotter, for instance, asks: “why do we think that the best 
way to make sense of our lives and to act for the best is in terms of theoretical 
formulations provided us by experts (rather than in terms of more practical, everyday 
forms of knowledge?)” (Shotter, 1993, p.19). Science formulates research findings in 
its own particular (community based) language and is concerned with generalization 
rather than particularization (Abma & Stake, 2001). Tineka Abma and others suggest 
that these practices increase the distance between scientists and other sorts of 
practitioner (see especially Gergen, 1994, p. 30-64) such that the latter feel they 
cannot meaningfully apply scientific knowledge to their own local practices (Cunliffe 
& Shotter, 2006). Yet technical rationality (Schön, 1983) assumes that science 
produces applicable knowledge and that, indeed, scientific knowledge is superior to 
e.g., the knowledge of day-to-day practices (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
Relational constructionist premises neither sharply distinguish nor elevate 
science above other "forms of life." Furthermore, they provide no necessary grounds 
for differentiating inquiry (as finding out) from intervention (grounded in already 
acquired findings). On the contrary, our relational premises imply that participating in 
inquiry inevitably (re)constructs peoples' lives in some degree (McNamee, 1994) and 
imply that all participants – including scientific researchers – construct and 
reconstruct their local (community-based) knowledges, identities and relations. From 
this it follows that research may be practised in ways that construct researchers as co-
practitioners and practitioners as co-researchers (Cunliffe & Shotter, 2006). Viewing 
research (or, as we prefer to call it, inquiry) as intervention, and shifting reflexive 
attention to the research process itself, enables a relational conception of ethics and 
responsibility – which is the next "possibility space" we want to explore. 
 
Relational ethics/Relational Responsibility 
 
The ethics of a "modernist" (Gergen & Thatchenkery, 1996) or "mainstream" 
(Thompson & McHugh, 1995) meta-theory largely focus on how not to intervene in 
the lives of the researched, for instance by guarantying anonymity of interviewees, by 
not asking inappropriate questions and by having ethical audits before and after the 
data collection phase (see e.g., Baker, 1999). However, as we have said, our relational 
premises imply that inquiry is intervention. Participants draw upon the “forms of life” 
in which they participate and, in this sense, inquiry draws from and can contribute to 
the daily lives of participants. What we now want to emphasize is that this both 
broadens the scope of ethical issues and reflexivity and gives them a much more 
central place. So for example, it now makes sense to reflect on the possibilities that 
any particular inquiry may open up and develop. In principle, reflections on the local 
use-value in relation to each and every participating "form of life" could be centred 
(Gergen & Hosking, 2006). And if one form of life (e.g., science) is not to dominate 
others, then ongoing open, reflexive dialogues about “how we are going on together” 
would be required. Sheila McNamee speaks of this as a matter of relational (rather 
than individual) responsibility (McNamee, 2004) – relational responsibility for the 
research process – and the kinds of people and worlds it (re)produces. This seems 
most likely to require a continuing and open-ended process of exploration in which 
conversations concern themselves with relationships and possible ways of performing 
them (McNamee & Gergen, 1999).    
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Ongoing Reflexive Dialogues Directed at the Research Process 
 
Discussing the ways constructionist premises can expand possible research 
practices Gergen outlined three important "overtures to innovation." The first was 
deconstruction - “wherein all presumptions of the true, the rational, and the good are 
open to suspicion” (Gergen, 1994, p. 62). The second was democratization or 
"relational responsibility", and the third – reconstruction – “wherein new realities and 
practices are fashioned for cultural transformation” (Gergen, 1994, p. 63). Reflexive 
dialogues are a way of putting these "overtures" to work in research. This can be done 
by inviting communal reflection (Gergen & Gergen, 1991) throughout the inquiry. 
Another possibility is to “start” an inquiry by organising a reflexive workshop in 
which participants dialogue about what they want from the process. Dialogues can 
articulate differing research questions and objectives, perhaps heightening the 
possibility that multiple local realities will be potentiated. Further, such dialogues 
might make it more likely that participants feel responsible for “making the inquiry 
work.”  
Below we address three topics that communal reflections can address: research 
identities; who participates and the narratives on which they draw, and last; reporting 
strategies.  
 
A) Emerging research identities 
 
 When a researcher asks someone to participate in an inquiry (e.g., as an 
interviewee) it is highly probable that s/he considers this person an expert on a 
particular topic (McNamee, 1994). In other words, the researcher (implicitly) believes 
that such a person has practical knowledge, or practical theories relevant to a 
particular research topic (Schön, 1983; Shotter, 1993). However, and as we have said, 
it is usually The Researcher whose voice dominates the what, the how, and the why – 
in relation to values, norms and interests from his scientific "form of life."   
  Relational constructionist premises allow that research participants can 
dialogue research identities and relations. In this way a subject-object understanding 
of research relations might be de-constructed or “unforgotten” (Chia, 1996) – 
opening-up other possible constructions of identities and relations. To put this slightly 
differently, reflexive practices can include reflections on power as it seems to be and 
as it could be constructed in the ongoing here and now. This can be theorised as a 
moral or relationally responsible practice; in this way a research process can 
”become” a process in which The Researcher becomes someone who contributes one 
expertise among many as the identities of researcher and researched are more fluid 
and open.  
 
B) Who participates and the narratives they mobilise 
 
For many practitioners, an important ethical issue in every inquiry is the issue 
of whose voices are (not) included, who’s muted and who’s silenced. This also can 
become an important topic for reflexive dialogues. Drawing upon actor network 
theory, Hardy, Philips, and Clegg (2001; see also Latour, 1987) suggested that 
researchers would do well to encourage reflexive dialogues on the narratives 
participants draw on and thus, the local constructions they mobilize. ”Self” may try to 
enrol “other” (Latour) - for instance, interviewees may try to promote their story and 
constructions of its truth-value by trying to fix their identity as reliable and 
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trustworthy. At the same time, “interviewees” may relate to the researcher as the one 
who decides what themes need to be addressed during an interview. The Researcher, 
for example, can try to generate new ways of relating by exploring other participants' 
research objectives and inviting them to into dialogues of equals to co-create 
relational responsibility for the process. In ways such as these, reflexive practices can 
open up possibilities for transforming realities and relations (Gergen, 1994).  
 
C) Reporting strategies 
 
The research report is traditionally seen as the place to present The Outcomes 
– the end results of the (now ended) research process. Our meta-theoretical 
assumptions offer a different view – the process is the product (Brown & Hosking, 
1986); but the process has no clear “end” to report.  Part of what this can mean is that 
writing “about” the research also can be seen as research (Richardson, 2003). 
Relational responsibility would again require practices that cast a reflexive gaze on 
how self-other relationships are characterised – this time - in the written text. Indeed, 
Rhodes and Brown (2005) argue that  
 
responsibility to the Other might be considered a guiding principle in 
writing research… An ethics of research writing emerges through the 
characterization of the relations between self and other in the text. 
(Rhodes & Brown, 2005, p. 470)  
 
So, for example, the style and content of the report can (re)construct subject-
object relations by presenting a knowing subject who can speak for and about other as 
an object.  Alternatively, the style, form and content of the reporting strategy can be 
more open and, for example, oriented towards processes, possibilities and generative 
theorising.  
Another possibility is that full and equal participation is attempted in the 
writing of the report.  Participative research practices can be extended to include "co-
generated reports" (Allard-Poesi, 2005) and, of course, the process of writing itself 
can stimulate reflexive dialogues. Communal reflections on such matters constitute 
another way of putting relational responsibility or ethics to work and can be another 
way to further articulate multiple local knowledges in research processes.  
Finally, the style of the reporting strategies can be one of “thin” and/or “thick” 
descriptions (Stake, 1995). Our earlier arguments all lead in the direction of thick 
description as a way of opening up to multiple local language games and their related 
forms of life. Tineke Abma is one of a number of writers who has proposed a 
narrative reporting strategy as a way of stimulating reflexivity (see Abma, 1996). 
Together with the use of an open, and exploratory style, a narrative approach can also 
make the text more widely accessible to readers who participate in different language 
games.  
 
Multiple Local Ways of Knowing and “Power to” 
 
Relational processes (re)construct more or less loosely interconnected “forms 
of life” including their local knowledge(s), be they what some might call intuition or 
“rules of thumb” (Cunliffe, 2003; Schön, 1983) or, indeed, what other “forms” call 
propositional knowledge. The latter, for example., as produced by science, is 
relatively explicit in comparison to “participatory ways of knowing” (Cunliffe & 
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Shotter, 2006) which are ways of “knowing-in-action” (Schön), knowing rather than 
knowledge, knowing that can be said to be “unbounded, fluid, bodily sensed and often 
tacit, implicit in one’s practices and expressions” (Cunliffe & Shotter, p. 235).  
Reflexive research, by giving space to multiple local-cultural and local-
historical realities in different but equal relation, has the possibility to develop local 
practical theories and other forms of “knowing-from-within”. Perhaps this is why 
some suggest that reflexive inquiry can be conceptualized as a communal learning 
process (Cunliffe, 2002). Our relational-responsive emphasis invites all research 
participants to share responsibility for learning:  
 
notions of symmetry [...] become key as (teacher-student) power 
relations are repositioned from that of expert/learner (where the expert 
believes in his/her legitimacy to impose his/her views) to that of [...] a 
shared responsibility for constructing learning. (Cunliffe, 2002, p. 14) 
 
Another way to say this is that relational premises open-up the possibility 
space for power relations to include power to - practices that allow the construction of 
different but equal forms of life - and not just the power over associated with subject-
object ways of relating (Gergen, 1995; Hosking, 1995).  
 
Conclusions 
 
We described a relational constructionism that gives ontology to relational 
processes and treats self-other and relations as emergent constructions made and 
remade in these processes. We outlined three discourses of reflexivity and their 
associated meta- theoretical assumptions. Our third discourse provided the standpoint 
from which we reflected on the other two as two possible relational constructions and 
offered other possible ways of radically reconstructing reflexive practices. In this 
radical reconstruction, reflexivity: is no longer oriented towards generalizable 
knowledge that is distinct from practice; is neither an individual activity nor a matter 
of individual ethics; and is no longer a matter of looking back on a finished process. 
Instead it becomes an ongoing relational process of “turning back” on the construction 
of the ”inquiry.” Reflexive dialogues, directed at the research process, can open up 
new ways of going on together by mobilizing local knowledges and communally 
reflecting on research identities and relations. These dialogues can all be considered 
attempts to construct soft self-other differentiation. In this way reflexivity is not a 
slide into infinite regress, but an opening up to multiple local forms of life and to 
possibilities rather than probabilities (Gergen, 1994; Hosking, 2008).  
Future research might explore how reflexivity could be stimulated within 
particular local communities such as organizational consultancy or intervention work 
with communities. Of course, given our focus on local-cultural, local-historical 
relational realities we cannot assume that the specific “content” of relational realities 
can be generalized across time and place. However, the various ways we have 
outlined of practicing reflexivity in inquiries could be taken up and made useful 
elsewhere. In addition, writing and discussing reflexivity in particular inquiries and 
communities could help others more easily to locate relevant analogies (Gergen & 
Hosking, 2006). We hope this article may contribute to the furthering of reflexive, 
relationally responsible inquiry.  
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